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Abstract 
Given a group composed of N individuals and given a 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for each individual 
in the group, how can these be aggregated to obtain a group 
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The implications 
of a set of axioms, analogous to Arrow's, using individual 
cardinal utilities--rather than Arrow's ordinal rankings--are 
investigated. The result is a group cardinal utility function 
which explicitly requires interpersonal comparison of pref- 
erence. Suggestions for who should make these comparisons 
and how they might be done are given. 
1. Introduction 
How should a group of individuals choose among a set of 
alternatives? Certainly there are a host of possible answers 
here ranging from formal aggregation schemes to informal dis- 
cussion until a concensus emerges. The general problem-- 
sometimes referred to as the social welfare problem--has 
drawn much attention from economists, sociologists, political 
scientists, etc. 
The problem is often formalized along the following lines. 
A set of N individuals I i = 1 , .  N must collectively i ' 
select an alternative a from the set A = {a , j = 1,2,. . . ,MI. 
- j - j 
It is assumed that each individual I can articulate his pre- i 
ferences, denoted by Pi. For instance, could be a ranking 
of the M alternatives, or it could be a preference structure 
such as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over the 
set of'possible consequences of the alternatives, or it could 
be expected utilities associated with the alternatives. The 
problem is to obtain the group preferences PG given the 
individual preferences P i = 1,2,.-.,N. Thus, a function i ' 
f is needed such that 
The usual approach has been to put reasonable restrictions on 
the manner in which the P are combined, and then derive the i 
implications this places on f. For instance, one such 
restriction might be if P. = P for all i, then PG = P, the 
1 
common individual preference. 
There are two versions of the problem formalized by (1) 
which are of interest in this paper. These will be referred 
to as the benevolent dictator problem and the participatory 
group problem. In the former case, the aggregation rule, 
that is the f in (I), is externally imposed by some individual-- 
the benevolent dictator. In the participatory group, the group 
itself must internally generate the aggregation rule for 
selecting a best group alternative. The theoretical development 
is the same for both of these versions of the "social welfare 
problem," however, the necessary input assessments needed to 
implement the results must be obtained in different manners. 
In Section 2, we briefly summarize aspects of Arrow's [I] 
work on th.e social welfare problem. His formulation assumed 
PG and the Pi were rankings of the alternatives. His result 
is that, in general, there is no f which satisfies five 
1 1  reasonable" assumptions;and, hence, the assumptions are 
incompatible. Arrow's formulation, since it used rankings, 
did not incorporate any concepts of strength of preference 
nor did it attempt to interpersonally compare preferences. 
Harsanyi [ 2 ]  was among the first to investigate assumptions 
leading to a group von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. 
More recently, Sen [ 7 ]  has shown that formulations with the 
structure of (1) require interpersonal comparison of utility 
in order to achieve a group preference for all possible sets 
of individual preferences. 
This paper formulates the group decision problem in a 
manner analogous to Arrow except that the group preference 
P~ and the individual preferences P are utilities of the i 
alternatives in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. In 
Sections 3 and 4, we successively investigate two models: 
the certain alternative model, where it is assumed that al- 
ternatives have known consequences, and the uncertain alter- 
native model, where there may be uncertainties associated 
with the consequences of the decision. The uncertainty model 
allows one to include certain alternatives, that is, each 
alternative need not involve uncertainty. For both models 
it is shown that given five assumptions analogous to Arrow's 
using cardinal utilities rather than rankings, it is always 
possible to define consistent aggregation rules for a group 
cardinal utility function. These rules explicitly require 
interpersonal comparison of preference. Suggestions for 
obtaining the necessary assessments to utilize these aggrega- 
tion rules are given in Section 5. 
2. Arrow's Im~ossibilitv Theorem 
Arrow proves that, in general, there is no procedure for 
obtaining a group ordering (i.e. ranking) of the various al- 
ternatives, call this P based on individual group members G ' 
orderings Pi that is consistent with five seemingly reasonable 
assumptions. That is there is no f satisfying (1) when the 
Pi's are rankings that is consistent with these five conditions: 
Assumption Al. There are at least two individual members in 




Luce and Raiffa 
assumptions and 
Independence of 
a group ordering is specified for all possible 
individual member's orderings. 
If the group ordering indicates alternative g 
is preferred to alternative b for a certain 
set of individual orderings, then the group 
ordering must imply - a is preferred to b if: 
i 1 the individual's orderings of alter- 
natives other than 2 are not changed, and 
ii) each individual's ordering between a and 
any other alternative either remains 
unchanged or is modified in favor of 5. 
If an alternative is eliminated from consider- 
ation, the new group ordering for the remaining 
alternatives should be equivalent (i.e. the 
same ordering) to the original group ordering 
for these same alternatives. 
For each pair of alternatives and 4,  there 
is some set of individual orderings such that 
the group prefers 5 to 1. 
There is no individual with the property that 
whenever he prefers alternative a to+h, the 
group will also prefer g to b regardless of the 
other individual's orderings. 
[ 6 1  examine the reasonableness of these 
suggest that Assumption A3, referred to as 
Irrelevant Alternatives Assumption is the 
weakest of the five. The problem arises from interpreting 
(or misinterpreting) an individual's strength of preference 
of one alternative over another based on that individual's "close- 
ness" in ranking of the two alternatives. In what follows, our 
formulation explicitly utilizes individual's strength of 
preferences and avoids this particular difficulty. 
3. A Cardinal Utility Axiomatization for Certain Alternatives 
The specific problem addressed is as follows. For each 
individual I i = 1,2, . . . ,  N ,  we are given the set of i ' 
cardinal utilities u.(a.) of the alternatives 2 j = l,2y...,M. 
= J  j ' 
We wish to obtain group cardinal utilities u (a.) for 
G -1 
eacha. fromthe u.(a.) consistent with five assumptions 
-1 1 'J 
analogous to Arrow's. For decision purposes, the best group 
alternative is the one associated with the highest group utility 
In terms of (I), the problem is to find a function u suc.h that 
that is consistent with five axioms: 
Assum~tion B1. There are at least two individual members in 
the group, at least two alternatives, and group 
utilities are specified for all possible 
individual member's utilities. 
Assumption B2. If the group utilities indicate alternative 2 
is preferred to alternative b for a certain 
set of individual utilities, then the group 
utilities must imply - a is preferred to b if: 
i 1 the individual's utilities of alternatives 
other than 2 are not changed, and 
ii) each individual's utilities for 5 either 
remains unchanged or is increased. 
Assumption B3. If an alternative is eliminated from consider- 
ation, the new group utilities for the remain- 
ing alternatives should be equivalent (i.e. 
positive linear transformations) to the original 
group utilities for these same alternatives. 
Assumption B4. For each pair of alternatives 2 and b, there 
is some set of individual utilities such that 
the group prefers p to b. 
Assumption B5. There is no individual with the property that 
whenever he prefers alternative 5 to b, the 
group will also prefer a to b regardless of the 
other individual's utilities. 
As can be seen, the main distinction--and the only relevant 
one--between these assumptions and Arrow's is the substitution 
of group and individual utilities for his group and individual 
orderings. The interesting result is that for certain alterna- 
tives, there are many possible forms of u in (2) which satisfy 
Assumptions B1 - B5, whereas there were no f's in (1) consistent 
with Arrow's Assumptions A1 - A5. Let us investigate the 
properties of such forms to indicate that in fact some do exist. 
Theorem 1. A given group cardinal utility function 
with Assumptions B 1  - B5 if and only if 
and not equal to zero for at least two u 's. i 
Proof. Let us assume u of (2) satisfies condition (3). Then 
B1 is trivially satisfied. If ui for an alternative - a in- 
creases, then u increases if au/au. in the region of u is 
1 i 
positive and remains unchanged if au/aui is zero. Hence B2 is 
satisfied. Given u, dropping an alternative has no effect on the 
u values for the remaining alternatives so B3 is met. If each 
individual prefers - a to - b, then since au/aui is positive for 
at least one u and never negative for any u the u assigned i i ' 
to - a using (2) must be bigger than that assigned to - b. Thus 
condition B4 is satisfied. Assumption B5 is also satisfied by 
(2) because there is always some small amount E such that if 
individual Ii prefers - a to - b by a utility margin of E, and if 
all other individuals prefer - b to a, then since au/aui must 
- 
be positive for at least one of the other N - 1  individuals, 
alternative - b must be assigned a larger u than alternative - a
implying the group prefers - b. 
To prove the converse, let us argue by contradiction. 
Assume assumptions B1 - B5 are satisfied but that condition 
(3) is not met. Suppose au/au < 0. Then an increase in u 1 1 
for some alternative - a would imply a decrease in u assigned 
to - a so assumption B2 could be violated. Thus no au/aui can 
be negative. If all au/aui are zero, assumption B4 is violated. 
If only au/aul is positive with au/au = 0, i = 2, ..., N, then i 
individual I dictates policy violating assumption B5. Thus 1 
assumptions B1 - B5 imply condition (3) with at least two au/au i 
positive. ( 
It is worthwhile to indicate why cardinal utility functions, 
the u and the u i l s ,  might be used when, in fact, there are no 
uncertainties. All that would be needed is a function which 
ranks the N-tuples (ul,u2, ..., u ) in order to select the best N 
alternative. The reason for using cardinal utility functions 
is twofold. First u provides an indication of the relative 
strength of preference for the alternatives. Second, each u i 
provides an indication of individual I 's relative strengths i 
of preferences for the alternatives, which in turn greatly 
simplifies consistent scaling of the u 's as shown in Section 5. i 
4. A Cardinal Utility Axiomatization for Uncertain Alternatives 
We have established that group cardinal utility functions 
consistent with assumptions B1 - B5 do exist when the arguments 
of these functions are different individual's cardinal utilities 
of certain alternatives. Let us now expand our problem to in- I 
clude uncertain alternatives. For this interpretation, it may 
be more convenient to think of the certain alternatives as being 
tautological to the consequences which they imply. An uncertain 
alternative indicates which of the a 's may result and their 
- j 
associated probabilities, which will be denoted p . In general, j 
the different individuals associated with a particular problem 
may be in disagreement about the values of the p 's for any j 
particular situation. 
Let us examine the formulation implied by assumptions 
B1 - B5 when the individual's expected utilities, rather than 
utilities of certain alternatives, are inputs to the utility 
function u of (2). Note that in this case u will also be an 
G 
expected utility. We will prove the following strong result. 
Theorem 2. A given group cardinal utility function u = 
G 
u(u1,u2, . . . ,  u ) over uncertain alternatives is consistent with N 
assumptions B1 - B5 if and only if 
where k i  - > 0 ,  i = 1, . . . ,  N and k > 0 for at least two k i t s .  i 
Proof. The power leading to this result is mainly in the 
formulation (2) itself. The formulation says u is a cardinal 
utility function and only the expected utility to each indi- 
vidual is important. If the individuals are each indifferent 
between two uncertain alternatives, then each individual must 
have the same expected utility for the two alternatives. Since 
the u i l s  in (2) are now expected utilities, the group utility 
for the two alternatives must be equal since the arguments are 
identical. Harsanyi [2] proved twenty years ago that if it 
follows that the group is indifferent between two uncertain 
alternatives whenever the individuals are indifferent, then 
u must be additive. Assumption B2 implies the k 's are non- i 
negative. Assumptions B4 and B5 imply at least two ki ' s are 
positive. The converse follows since (4) implies (3). 4 
The power of the formulation using expected utilities 
comes about from the fact that the "balance" of utilities 
among individuals is assumed to be unimportant. To briefly 
illustrate let us investigate a problem with two individuals 
and consider two specific alternatives. Alternative A results 
in either (ul = 1, u2 = 0) with probability one-half or 
(ul = 0, u2 = 1) with probability one-half. Alternative B 
yields either (ul = 1, u2 = 1) or (ul = 0, u2 = 0), each with 
probability one-half. Note that individual 11, whose utility 
is measured by u would be indifferent between alternatives 1 ' 
A and B since they both have the same expected utility. For 
the same reason, individual I2 would be indifferent. Thus it 
follows that the group of two must be indifferent if the 
formulation is accepted. However, note that alternative B 
might be considered preferable to alternative A because it is 
"fair" to both individuals. A discussion of such "equity" 
considerations, as well as forms of cardinal utility functions 
which promote equity, are found in Kirkwood [ 5 ]  and Keeney 
and Kirkwood [ 4 ] .  
5 .  Interpretation and Assessment of the Group Utility Functions 
The assessments necessary to implement the formulation 
of the last section come from different sources for the two 
versions--the benevolent dictator and the participatory group-- 
of group decision problems defined at the beginning of the 
paper. In both cases the cardinal utilities of the alterna- 
tives come from the individuals who make up the groups; each 
individual articulates his own utilities. The more difficult 
assessments concern obtaining the scaling constants, that is 
the k's in (4). In the benevolent dictator model, the bene- 
volent dictator himself must make these judgments, whereas the 
group as a whole must assess the k's in the participatory 
group model. 
Assessing the k's requires interpersonal comparison of 
preferences. Since (4) is an appropriate utility function for 
both the certain alternative and uncertain alternative models, 
let us illustrate the point by considering the benevolent 
dictator who must assess the k's in (4). Since the individual's 
utilities can be arbitrarily scaled from zero to one, we can 
arbitrarily set u(O,O, ..., 0) = 0 and u(l,l, ..., 1) = 1, where 
u is actually the benevolent dictator's utility function. 
The benevolent dictator must consider questions like which of 
(1,0, ..., 0) or (0,1,0, ..., 0) he prefers. It is easily to show 
from (4) that u(1,0, . . . ,  0) = kl and u(0,1,0, . . . ,  0) = k2 so if 
the former is preferred, then kl > k2. With similar con- 
siderations, a ranking of the k's can be developed. These 
considerations are not easy since the benevolent dictator 
must conjur up in his mind what a u = 0 and a u = 1 means 1 1 
to individual I and what a u = 0 and u2 = 1 means to 12, 1 2 
and then superimpose his own value structure about the relative 
desirability of the change in u from 0 to 1 versus the change 1 
in u from 0 to 1, etc. Suppose kl is greater than k2, then 2 
the benevolent dictator must ask himself, how much ul, call 
it u* is such that (uT,O, . . . ,  0) is indifferent to (0,1,0, . . . ,  0). 1 
By using (4) and equating utilities of these circumstances, 
we find k u* = k2. A similar procedure is repeated for each 1 1  
of the ui's which provides us with a set of N - 1 equations 
and N unknowns, the k,i's. Because of our scalidg convention, 
N 
the Nth equation is ki = 1. The values of the ki's can 
i= 1 
be found from this set of N equations. 
The same type of thinking must be followed in the partic- 
ipatory group decision model by each of the individuals in the 
group. However, in addition, they must somehow arrive at a 
concensus for the k's. Sometimes this may not be possible and 
thus the model could not be used as intended. 
In general, to assess the k's, one must find pairs of 
circumstances (.u;,ui, ..., u') and (u;I,u;, ..., ui) for which the N 
assessor(s) is indifferent. Then naturally u(ui,u;, ..., ui) = 
u(uy,u;, . . . ,  ui) gives us one equation with at most N unknown 
scaling constants. The idea to generate N independent equa- 
tions involving the scaling constants and then solve for them. 
Kirkwood [5] discusses an alternative approach for the assess- 
ment of the scaling constants. 
It is a difficult problem for the decision maker--the 
benevolent dictator in the benevolent dictator model or the 
group as a whole in the participatory group model--to make 
the requisite interpersonal comparisons of utility. An ex- 
cellent discussion of this issue is found in Harsanyi [ 3 ] .  
We make no pretense that interpersonal utility comparisons 
are easy, but they are often implicitly made in group decisions. 
When one c a n  formalize this aspect of the process, the group 
utility f u n c t i o n s  discussed in this paper d o  provide a m e a n s  




The comments by David E. Bell and Craig W. Kirkwood were 
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